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This study examines the impact of structural adjustment policy (SAP)
on the welfare of Zimbabweans, particularly women and children and
draws some parallels with economic policy in the US and its effect on
social welfare programs and the poor. The paper argues that economic
structuraladjustment programs (ESAPs), introduced by the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund as major internationalfinancial
institutions in economic globalization, have been an inappropriatepublic
policy for Zimbabwe. These economic reforms inflate poverty, decrease the
country's capability to develop a strong diversified domestic economy,
increase the exploitation of workers through deregulation accompanied
by environmental degradation. ESAPs' devastation of the poor translates
into recurrences of socioeconomic crises that threaten peace and social
justice and compounded by naturalcalamitiesand the relentlessness of the
HIVIAIDS pandemic. Human helping professionals like social workers are
left to scramble for diminishing resources to meet the basic needs of more
clients with less.

INTRODUCTION
Approximately 80 percent of malnourished children in developing countries are found in countries were farmers have
been forced by structural adjustment policies (SAPs) to shift their
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agricultural production from subsistence to export production for
industrialized nations (Global Exchange, 2000). Whereas Africa
accounts for one tenth of the world population, it generates almost half of the world's displaced people and refugees most
of whom are women and children. The International monetary
Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) capitalist model of development operationalized through economic structural adjustment
programs' (ESAPs) prescriptions to debtor countries and enforced
by the World Trade Organization (WTO), prioritize export production over cultivating a diversified domestic economy. Such
an approach is in contrast with the route taken by industrialized
nations that created these organizations prescribing ESAPs for
the South. This economic reform policy, which was designed
to strengthen multinational corporations also ensures its operation efficacy by integrating elites from all developing countries
through its reward-and-punishment system while alienating the
masses of these countries.
Despite the fact that Zimbabwe and Ghana were economic
success stories of the 1980s and early 1990s (Boafo-Arthur, 1991),
they have both plunged into economic crises with the Zimbabwe's
GDP recording far much lower than before the adoption of the
SAPs (French, 1998). Thus, problems of Africa are directly linked
to ventures of Western exploitation of Africa. The African elites
have become closer while alienating the majorities who have
sunk into further impoverishment due to the strings attached to
ESAPs' policy prescriptions to the debtor governments allowing
international corporations to gain easy entry and access into the
countries' labor force and resources unabated and at bottom line
bargain prices compounded by privatization (selling of publicly
owned assets to the private-sector/corporations).
The elitist governments that have historically and steadfastly
manipulated the sentiments of the masses in order to gain the
initial tacit approval that legitimize their regimes were pressured
to adopt ESAPs, an ill-fated decision leading to what looks like
the recolonization of Africa as the debtor governments loose the
following of their own people, control over land, services and
industries. Once independent, broad participation in the formulation and implementation of public policy such as structural
adjustment programs (SAPs) dwindles, a major weakness across
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Sub Sahara Africa. Additionally, African elites have lost their
role in competitive imperialism of the cold war era, in which
their role entailed playing off one imperial power against the
other, but are now victims of monopolistic imperialism. Instead
of propagating self-reliance, the African elites are now adopters
and implementers of Western imposed SAPs (Mazrui, 1996).
With Africa's external debt rising from US$212.2 billion to
US$271 billion between 1986-1990 (Jamal, 1994), it is not surprising even after independence, the post-colonial era mirrors
the colonial one. The rising debt trend continues well into the
s
2 1 t century, accompanied by sharp declines in living standards
witnessed by increases in absolute poverty from 270 million in the
mid-eighties to 335 million people in 1990 (Jamal, 1994; Global
Exchange, 2000). The interests of primary beneficiaries, mostly
Northern educated Africans and the skillful lobbyist-descendants
of colonialists have flourished at the expense of the subordinate
large classes of workers and peasants, women and children under
the IMF and WB economic development model. Zimbabwe's
proclamations of nationalism, indigenization, promotion of popular peace, social and human rights and environmental conservation have rarely been translated into practice. Worse still building
sustainable democracy is difficult during periods of national economic difficulties. Also, given the mechanisms by which the WB
and IMF used in the imposition of structural adjustment policies
(ESAPs) on many African governments prior to the seal of approval to get loans for economic liberalization and globalization,
and given the underpinnings of democracy, some policy analysts
argue that the two processes are antithetical (Jeong, 1998; Jamal,
1994; Boafo-Arthur 1999).
Zimbabwe's economy had been characterized by weak
growth in the productive sector with crises of varying degrees
during the 1970s and with much more severity in the late 1980s
when export performance declined as reflected in the falling
shares of Zimbabwe exports in world trade and an unchanged
export structure. Since pre-independence Zimbabwe's industrial
base owed much to import-substitution (local production of
goods as an alternative to imported ones) and to the incentives provided during its long period of isolation under international sanctions, there had clearly been economic benefits in past
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industrial strategies. At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe had the
advantage of a sophisticated industrial economy, higher levels of
entrepreneurial talent and general human capital, which allowed
it to use import substitution to better effect than its neighbors did
and was considered a vibrant economy.
By the end of 1980, foreign debt rose sharply and the socioeconomic infrastructure deteriorated concurrently with environmental degradation. Debates on the causes of the crises centered
on two sets of factors. The first comprised exogenous factors
such as bad weather, deteriorating terms of trade, fluctuation of
international interest rates, reduced inflows of foreign aid and
non-performing state-owned enterprises as constituting a huge
drain on government finances. The second emphasized endogenous factors such as inappropriate domestic policies and incentive structures, and the mismanagement of public resources. The
crises had important implications for transforming Zimbabwe's
economy as envisaged by the WB and IMF who recommended
SAPs under the second premises that endogenous policy measures would improve the nation's economic growth. Zimbabwe's
adoption of ESAPs in 1991 was a reversal of a previous government's position rejecting the same structural reforms with
the same conditionalities in the 1980s, when many sub-Sahara
Africa's early birds to SAPs adopted them. Whereas government
ministries that deal with education, health, social services and
other social spending programs were not included, the process
of ESAPs' adoption was dominated by officials of commercial
banks and finance ministry (the most conservative western educated and wealthy members of the government), and the experienced white lobbying groups (the economic backbone). All
these participants would be the potential primary beneficiaries
of ESAPs. Even these collaborators felt pressured by the IMF and
WB, because countries that do not comply with these Washingtonbased institutions, controlled by the Group of Eight (G8) [US,
UK, Japan, Germany, France Canada and Italy], would be isolated with their chances of getting loans and international aid
thwarted. Thus, Zimbabwe's adoption of economic policy reforms was considered compatible with contemporary style for
achieving sustainable national economic development. As will
be demonstrated in proceeding sections, the initial Zimbabwean
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spurt of import-substituting industrial growth faltered not long
after adopting ESAPs, a trend in many African countries.
This study examines the impact of ESAPs on the living standards of Zimbabwe people and draws some parallels between
the impact of economic policy on social welfare of particularly
impoverished women and children in Zimbabwe and the United
States. The paper argues that SAP is an inappropriate public
policy for Zimbabwe. The economic reforms that were introduced
by the WB and IMF and adopted by the Zimbabwean government spelled mass economic disaster, exacerbated the HIV/AIDS
devastation of the most productive population of society compounded by various natural calamities. This study demonstrates
that ESAPs have further marginalized the Zimbabwean people
particularly women and children more than they were ever before because the mandated budget austerity leads to cutting social spending and squeezing more from the tax payer through
increased education costs. This makes it harder for families to
subsist forcing them to withdraw their children from school,
particularly girls in a patrilineal society devaluing females. Prioritizing export agriculture leads to reduced food production,
which forces women to be exploited in the labor force in which
labor laws have been loosened through ESAPs' deregulation that
undermine labor social rights (Global Exchange, 2000; Danaher,
2000). Alternatively, they turn to indentured servitude or prostitution increasing the women's HIV infection risk and that of
their children. Thus, creating an environment that threatens peace
and social justice. Social workers and other human helping professions are now left to scramble for diminishing resources to
meet the basic needs of more clients with less. Thus, some of
the policies implemented after independence by the Zimbabwean
government aimed at redistributing resources or alleviating poverty have been unsuccessful, or had perverse effects on the people
of the nation, complicated by the absence of democratic procedure
in their adoption and implementation.
PREMISE OF ECONOMIC STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS
This section addresses the premise of structural adjustment
policies in an attempt to explain why such programs might be
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inappropriate for developing nations such as Zimbabwe. During
the past two decades, sub-Sahara African nations have adopted
the WB and IMF prescribed ESAPs, which are based on classical
economic theories and whose protocol entails three implementation phases. The initial phase involves the Economic Structural
Program Agreement between an African government and the WB
and IME This phase operationalizes the contract by the stroke of
a pen and is the easiest one. The major tenets of the agreement
require the debtor governments to apply the following measures:
(1) Eliminate price controls; (2) Cut subsidies to prices of basic
goods and services; (3) Engage in Free trade; and (4) Devaluation
of currencies (Jeong, 1998; French, 1998; Mazrui, 1996). The second
stage involves implementation which is followed by the third
and final phase of program evaluation of adjustment reforms programs by the debtor government under the supervision of the WB
and IMF and the policing of the WTO, which can overrule national
policies when deemed violating international corporations' profit
rights (Global Exchange, 2000; Danaher, 2000).
The paper, therefore, argues that this classical economics approach to development has six major flaws contributing to ESAPs'
failure to become a catalyst for the goals of achieving sustainable
development, by eliminating of the balance of payments deficits
or reduction in external indebtedness, and mass impoverishment.
Firstly, the reform policies do not consider exogenous factors like
terms of trade, fluctuating interest rates and reduced inflows
of foreign exchange and impact of natural disasters like cyclic
droughts and most recent year 2000 floods. Secondly they assume
a dogmatic approach which does not take into account any differences in the capabilities of individual economies and require the
supply of imports in export-oriented economies like Zimbabwe.
Thirdly, they require budget austerity which undermines human
capital development and investment and social services resulting
in serious negative consequences for the workforce. Fourthly,
they inflate unemployment and underemployment, which is presumed to be a temporary condition of the reforms, but in fact
wrecks the economy by drying up the consumption. Without
consumption, the existence of large populations of potential consumers turns into a burden for a welfare state even in the industrialized countries of the North, but worse still for a Sub-Saharan
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country like Zimbabwe with diminishing resources. Fifthly, the
combined effects of problems arising form a lack of budget austerity and the negative consequences to the workforce quality
and increased unemployment within the context of a wrecked
economy potentially lead to political crises, social unrest and violence leading to social disintegration. Sixthly, though not unique
to ESAPs is the general tendency of local greedy elite to sabotage
the general good for personal gain.
EXOGENOUS FACTORS
Zimbabwe adopted its structural adjustment programs in
1991. Much of the explanation of the poor structural adjustment
policy's performance in Zimbabwe lies with exogenous shocks
of various kinds: droughts, internal conflict, political instability,
and adverse terms of trade and so forth. Yet this is clearly not the
whole story. Poor policies also have to carry much of the blame. A
broad range of government policies affected industrial development, from general macroeconomic management, through trade
and competition policies and human resource development, to
specific industrial development and technology policies (Jamal,
1994; Global Exchange, 2000).
The fundamental macroeconomic problem in Zimbabwe in
the early1990s was that the sum of what the new government
wanted and planned to do was greater than the resources available. Such a situation was probably inevitable, but the government's difficulty in discerning the macroeconomic limitations
on new initiatives was greatly increased by the unusual circumstances of the first two ESAP years: a commodity boom; promises
of more international aid than what was eventually delivered;
expectations of a peace dividend which did not come; initial high
rates of economic growth; and initial reduction in foreign debt. All
of these circumstances created unrealistic expectations, concealing the probability that the government's plans would be impossible to finance. The government was slow to meet adjustment time
lines being disappointed by unmet promises of international aid.
This created a debt problem. Drought and terms-of-trade shocks
made things worse. Drought was bound to occur periodically;
only the timing was unpredictable. No allowance was made for
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the likelihood of these shocks in ESAP agreements. The severe
drought of 1991-1992 in Zimbabwe provided justification for the
government's reluctance to engage in cutting expenditure. When,
however, the government made no progress with reducing the
size of the budget deficit after the agricultural sector recovery
in 1993-1994, the IMF began to apply pressure for compliance.
This marked a turning point in the ability of the government to
maintain autonomy in deciding on economic policy.
Globalization of world markets became one of the greatest
challenges facing African countries like Zimbabwe in the 1990s.
Globalization enlightened us on the limitations of statehood autonomy particularly after the end of the Cold War when abuse
and exploitation of Africa was accompanied by its loss of the
geopolitical strategic value. More African countries have become
classified as least developed nations and not one African country
became classified as a developed nation as a result of efforts by
US and Russia or the UN. The adverse effects of trade restrictions
and protectionism increased in the 1990s. Marginalization of the
masses from political and decision-making processes, declining
competitiveness in Southern Africa Development Commission
and the global market, excessive state intervention in the economy, militating against investment and productivity, deteriorating social services, and standard of living became the norm.
Social development and progress of the 1980s was clearly
being eroded in the early 1990s with falling per capita incomes,
unemployment and underemployment, accelerating ecological
degradation and hunger. In the mid-1990s, Zimbabwe was confronted with serious internal and external contradictions, which
intensified marginalization. The crisis became more pronounced
with mounting foreign debts, declining exports, refugee problems, servicing foreign debt, urban strife due to increased food
prices and retrenchment. The failure of wage employment to keep
up with formal sector wage-employment created unemployment
and underemployment. Zimbabwe's crisis reached alarming proportions in the late1990s (Kadenge, Ndoro & Zizwi, 1992).
When Zimbabwe adopted the structural adjustment "policies
in 1990, the major features of the policies pursued included labor retrenchment, trade liberalization and currency devaluation,
subsidy withdrawal, and an increase in user fees (which rendered
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basic services like health and education unaffordable to the average worker). As elsewhere, macroeconomic reforms have had
very serious political implications in Zimbabwe. These measures
were seen by many as politically risky because of independent
Zimbabwe's colonial experience with unfair adjustment policies.
Industrial restructuring and the upgrading of industrial competitiveness have been components of these reforms prescribed
by the IMF and World Bank. An implicit assumption of SAPs
has been that enterprise-level inefficiencies are primarily a reflection of inappropriate macro-economic policies and distortions in
resource allocation precipitated by selective industrial policies.
Reforms, therefore, are based on the premise that appropriate
adjustment at the macro-level, accompanied by the "freeing up"
of market forces, liberalization of trade and privatization of parastatals would provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for
industrial recovery and growth. Inefficient activities, which exist
only because of government induced distortions rather than the
presence of learning sequences and market failures will die out,
while resources will move to efficient activities that emerge in
response to market incentives (Mkandawire 1992; Remmer 1993).
As a result, Zimbabwe and other debtor African nations' industry
would exhibit the dynamism and competitiveness that characterized East Asian economies between 1980 and 1996.
UNIQUE NATIONAL ECONOMIC CAPACITY
The theory underlying adjustment and market-friendly policies does not offer a satisfactory explanation for rapid industrialization in the type of economic culture, which prevail in
sub-Saharan (SSA) Africa, including Zimbabwe. This is because
the theory ignores the capability of development and the need
to overcome market failures in its process. This has an important
bearing on the general issue of industrial adjustment in SSA: an
initial favorable response of manufacturing to adjustment may
not lead to sustained growth and diversification if all ESAPs do
is "get prices right." (Jeong 1997; Hultman 1993; Gibbon 1992,
Nelson 1990). The existence of pervasive market failures raises
the costs of adjustment to import competition and holds back
the creation of new manufacturing activities and exports. The
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design of structural adjustment programs (SAPs), by ignoring
capability development (human and economic development to
strengthen and diversify local production capacity for sustainable
development), places too much stake in free markets that work
rapidly and effectively.
The other problem with SAPs is that they prescribe policies in
a universal and timeless setting: all markets are equally efficient,
and governments inefficient, in all nations, regardless of the stage
and level of development. The theory of technological capabilities
suggests, on the other hand, that different nations have very
different abilities to respond to open competition, depending on
the capabilities that they had built up before "opening up" (Jeong
1997; Hultman 1993; Gibbon 1992, Nelson 1990) such as how
successful previous import-substitution policies were. But the
post independence ESAPs' adjustment and liberalization failed
to cultivate the underlying human capabilities and the process
of acquiring them, seriously failing to promote future industrial
development (Gibbon 1992, Nelson 1990). There are few firms
involved in complex industrial activities that can sustain the full
force of import competition unless they have natural protection
from a strong local resource base or close links with Zimbabwean
consumers. The industrial structure remains, moreover, highly
concentrated in low-to-medium technology activities. Thus, simply opening up is not the best strategy even for a relatively
advanced industrial system. Much has to be done in terms of
promoting and upgrading technology and gearing the speed and
spread of the liberalization process to the rate at which capabilities
can be developed. In other African nations, the industrial structure is much simpler and the ability to cope with free markets
much weaker.
It is clear that SAPs policies have also failed in Zimbabwe
because once the usual simplifying assumptions on learning are
dropped, merely removing government interventions may not
catalyze industrial growth and competitiveness. Even in economies with relatively advanced levels of technology capability
like the United States, rapid liberalization imposes severe costs if
not accompanied by a strategy of upgrading and gearing liberalization to the learning needs of different activities. By contrast,
where the pace of opening up and support policies adopted to
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help firms upgrade is both guided by a clear strategy, the results
are far better (Jamal, 1994; Jeong, 1997). The liberalization policy
itself lacks full credibility and was not properly communicated
to firms in Zimbabwe, inducing them to remain passive and
wait for policies to revert to old, less threatening patterns. What
is surprising is that the disappointing reaction to liberalization
was not anticipated, even a basic understanding of technological
processes would have led to a different design of the liberalization
program (Jeong 1997; Gibbon 1992, Nelson 1990). On the contrary,
enterprise-level reactions are still not fully appreciated by those
who designed and propagate adjustment programs, at least in
their pronouncement on policy reform.
BUDGET AUSTERITY VS HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT
An alternative argument has been that most sun-Sahara
Africa, including Zimbabwe is not really suited to industrialization, beyond the elementary level of resources-based and low
technology activities that do not compete with imports. Indeed,
some classical economists prescribe this while forgetting that
the endowments that lead to successful industrialization are not
given but made as a result of deliberation policy. For example, would they have said that the Asian Tigers had a natural
comparative advantage in industrial activity 30 years ago? The
logic of the structural adjustment programs argument leads to
the efficiency outcome that very little industry may survive in
Zimbabwe, with growth proceeding mainly from primary and
service sector activities.
SAPs are conducive to a free market economy with private/
individual responsibility for social welfare. These classical macroeconomic-type programs overlook concerns of human capital
development (Midgley, 1995) and welfare by neglecting many
forms of protecting the poor. Neither do they make any good
faith effort to consider social objectives (Jeong, 1998; Danaher,
2000; Global Exchange, 2000). Adjustment policy is a reflection of
the values and choices of the ruling classes of the world, elites of
Africa as well as that of multinational corporations of the world.
If governments fail to meet certain measures like retrenchment
imposed by the IMF-World Bank, the loans promised them are
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withheld and/or canceled. World Bank-IMF force governments
to reduce spending of basic human needs and necessities like
the elimination of subsidies for food prices, reduction of social
welfare and social programs: health, education and so forth. In
Zimbabwe as elsewhere, the elimination of price controls on
manufactured goods, retrenchment of workers, devaluation of
currency and privatization of government industries resulted in
a sharp shrinkage of income opportunities for the urban middle
and working class while simultaneously marginalizing the poor
further, especially women and children. Women's opportunities
to work in these patriarchal societies dwindle. Even perceived
urban opportunities for rural poor are eroded further. Thus, after
the cold war, the former opponents of Western capitalism and
champions of Pan-Africanism and self-reliance have succumbed
to the Western neocolonialism based on the industrialized nations' economic prowess.
A successful imposition of policy measures through undemocratic tactics is completely different from the overall attainment of
the set objectives of such policy measures. The implementation of
structural adjustment was without citizen participation or input
in the formulation and implementation of the various programs.
Further, there existed an anti-liberal and intimidating political
climate that made it difficult for various groups opposed to such
programs to rise up against their imposition.
It is clear that a structural adjustment policy in practically
all the African nations has failed to produce industrial efficiency
and dynamism. Mainstream economic thinking has therefore not
been in favor of SAPs, particularly in Africa where the history of
import-substituting industrialization is marked by distorting and
pervasive government interventions, widespread inefficiency,
and a failure to become competitive. This disillusionment with
past industrial policy has been reinforced by classical economics
resurgence, which introduce strong political elements into the
argument, suggesting that all governments are inherently and
forever inefficient and corruptible. The adoption of these arguments by the two leading economic development institutions (WB
and IMF) in what is called democratizing the global economy
resulting in many African nations adopting, willingly or otherwise, strong liberalization policies (World Bank, 1994), and to the
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benefit of global elites and corporations (Global Exchange, 2000;
Danaher, 2000).
It was indicated earlier that Zimbabwe initially had a degree of autonomy in determining the pace of adjustment under
ESAP. Some aspects of reform-trade, price, foreign exchange and
financial-sector liberalization-were carried out swiftly, but little
progress was made on tax and public expenditure reform. Rapid
liberalization of prices may not necessarily be evidence of government commitment. It may also be interpreted as being the easy
part of structural adjustment programs-easier than structural
reforms like privatization or civil service reform. Moreover, price
reforms are easily monitored, and the technical difficulty of reform cannot be used as an excuse for delay as far as WB and IMF
conditionalities are concerned.
Policy measures have deliberately ignored industrialization
and rather have given greater incentives to the production of
primary commodities. Recent figures show that Zimbabwe's foreign debt rose from 45 percent of GDP in 1990 to 75 percent in
1994, falling to 67 percent of GDP at the end of 1995 (Jenkins,
1996). Around 95 percent of this are government debt including the parataltals or government-owned business organizations.
This increased aid sought and received during the 1992 drought
meant that the debt service ratio rose to 30 percent, although it
subsequently fell to 22 percent in 1995. The nation is, however,
vulnerable to external shocks, which may again force it to raise
its external borrowing.
The devastation of the ESAPs is an eye soar in Zimbabwe
and similarly situated African countries. Haggard and Kaufman
(1989) offer three main reasons for the perceived incompatibility
of adjustment and democracy. First, new democratic leaders are
confronted with previously repressed demands, heightened social and economic expectation, and strong pressures to reward
supporters and incoming groups. Second, as much as possible,
newly installed democratic governments will try to avoid difficult economic policies that might generate both economic and
political resistance or unrest. Finally, democratization will give
vent to heightened social demands which most probably will
lead to the pursuit of policies that will meet the expectations of
the electorate, reduce social conflict in the short run, and thereby
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garner political support. The concern for public support might
compel democratic governments to pursue populist policies at
the expense of structural adjustment or strict financial discipline.
Sirrowy and Inkeles (1990) further contend that because of the
political and civil liberties they rest on, democratic regimes only
act to inflame social divisions and erode the capacity of the government to act quickly for the expected results to be yielded.
The assumption is that government officials may be compelled to
shift their allegiances among policies based on short-run political
expediency rather than focusing exclusively on policies oriented
toward national development in the long run.
In early 1995 the IMF suspended a balance-of-payments support trance of US$120 million after the government failed to meet
its commitments to reduce the budget deficit, which reached 14
percent of GDP in 1994/5-against a target of 7 percent. The suspension of aid from the IMF resulted in other donors withholding
aid; for example, the European Union announced in March 1996
that it would give Zimbabwe US$32 million for drought relief,
health and education, but would block all other disbursement
until IMF/World Bank conditions, and specifically fiscal targets
were met (Jenkins, 1996). When the Zimbabwean government
missed its IMF-world bank conditionality target in 1995, the IMF
withdrew its lending obligations. The government nationalized,
instead of selling state controlled industries and services, the
move stifled the free market economy leading to a reduction
in competition, low economic growth and domestic borrowing
(Rotberg, 1998) required by the IME Investor confidence declined
and the stock market declined (Wanmali & Islam, 1997).
A combination of structural adjustment and the rising economic crisis has not lead to public expenditure cuts in Zimbabwe and similarly situated countries worldwide. Many
economic problems of Zimbabwe are directly related to deregulation. Since 1996, Zimbabwe has been facing potential collapse
(Anonymous, 1998a & 1998b). For the government to get the
176 million dollars from the IMF for crisis management, the
government had to give up land reforms and restrict government
spending. The civil service with a personnel of 180,000 including
social workers eats up one-third of the government's annual
budget expenditure, leading to a general inequitable decrease
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of incomes. For example, government officials have had their
incomes increased by 130 percent, while other workers have
received 3-20 percent increases and many have lost employment due to retrenchment and worse still the number of the
unemployed swell to a record high of over 50 percent by 1995
(Carnoy, 1995). The introduction of ESAP also had deleterious
impacts on some small industries leading to their closure due to
high operation costs and interest rates on loans (Kawewe, 1998).
The development of grassroots and small companies has been
constrained by high interest rates on bank loans and inflation.
Because urban populations of sub-Saharan Africa comprise a
majority of the urban poor, the decline in their living standards
has become massive and devastating over the SAP years. Even
the rural dwellers who had previously utilized the urban kin as
a safety net in times of hardship, have become more vulnerable,
especially within the context of an inherited and distorted colonial
land distribution and ownership pattern (Kawewe, 1998; Palmer
& Burich, 1992).
NATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL WELFARE
Independent Zimbabwe had attempted to structurally adjust before SAPs by compensating for the colonial legacy with
heavy investment in social programs by developing one of the
most elaborate education and health care systems in sub-Saharan
Africa in the 1980's. The social welfare system was beginning to
show signs of anguish due to over expenditure and the country
had accepted liberalization in 1991 convinced ESAPs would improve the economy and reduce poverty. However, at the behest
of ESAPs, Zimbabwe turned one of Africa's best social welfare
systems into shambles (Goga,1996). The situation was exacerbated by a drought of the century which plummeted the economy.
In order to improve the economy, those who were previously
eligible for free education and health care had to pay fees with
those eligible for exemption being discouraged by bureaucratic
red tape and poor quality of services. Even the United Nations
Economic Commission found that SAP countries in sub-Saharan
Africa cut their social programs expenditure by 25 percent on
education and 50 percent on health with infant mortality doubling
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during the ten previous year period. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) reports that the gap between the rich
and the poor doubled by 200 percent within the same decade
(Araghi, 1997).
ESAPS have further led to high unemployment due to massive retrenchment of labor in the public sector. Zimbabwean unemployment has further risen to approximately 60 percent with
the budget deficit rising above 25 percent of what it was at independence in 1980. The impact of ESAPs coupled with the inclement natural conditions has slashed the real incomes of the
majority of the urban population. Some private companies have
adopted the technologies that are state of the art to boost productivity while retrenching workers. In 1995 the official number
of retrenched workers stood at about 100,000, while unofficial
estimates by trade unions indicate figures between 150,000 and
160,000 lay offs (Jenkins 1996). Those who lose employment naturally lose their purchasing power and are faced with loss of
housing (Velempini & Traverse, 1997), quality health care, loss
of education opportunities for their children and loss of quality
of life and food supply for the whole family (Valempini et al,
1997), especially women and children as they may not be eligible
for public assistance available only to the privileged poor. The
devastation has not been only with already poor, but even the civil
sector workers who had previously been part of the so called 'labor aristocracy' had their incomes reduced to below subsistence
and worsened by public sector retrenchment (Potts, 1995). Hence
urban social services provision concurrently declined drastically,
narrowing the gap between rural and urban incomes. Yet, even
among such bleak conditions, social workers that are among
the affected are expected to empower their clients and instill an
optimistic future in them. It appears that in some cases there
has been reverse migration of people leaving the cities to the
overcrowded communal lands in rural areas as the urban poor
are the most directly and severely affected by ESAPs. Urbanites
correspondingly view the rural areas as their safety net in times
of hardship.
Higher unemployment leads to declining nutrition, health
and education standards, increasing school absences while at
the same time increasing the national demand for tertiary and
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secondary schooling. These factors combined, lead to a corresponding decline in income (Carnoy, 1995). As food prices rise,
some families have cut down on nutrition and food intake. For
example some families have stopped buying chicken, beef, bread
and fish. They have also cut back on the staple food (corn meal),
vegetables and the number of meals per day from the standard
three, to two or one in order to make ends meet. Obviously such
conditions adversely affect the health of children and women,
especially girl children (Kawewe, 1998). Urban families scramble
for any available patch of land to grow crops and vegetables for
consumption and for hawking. Even professionals' efforts at imparting nutrition knowledge do not translate into better nutrition
when clients cannot afford the bare minimum food requirements.
Such conditions of food scarcity have serious implications for children, childcare and women's health and welfare. This situation is
further complicated by the burden of unevenly distributed extra
work mostly shouldered by women, as elsewhere in the world
(Kawewe, 1998; Velempini & Traver, 1997).
The Zimbabwe's socioeconomic disparity, particularly the
colonial legacy of unequal land distribution by race is directly
related to employment and sustainable economic development.
Of the 11.5 million population of Zimbabwe, 7 million (75 percent)
of them are blacks who live in the overcrowded and underdeveloped rural reservations with some as squatters and landless.
There are 100,000 whites that comprise one percent of the Zimbabwean populations and four percent (4,000) of whites control
80 percent of the private enterprise and 50 percent of the country's
arable land. Numerically, 4,000 white own the country's best
farmland consisting of 11 million hectares and generate forty
percent of the country's commercial agricultural-goods export
revenue (Wanmali et al, 1997).
It is interesting to note that despite this unequal land privileges in Zimbabwe, the World Bank and IMF recommendation
for structural adjustment did not address the land issue. The preexisting post-independence national corrective measures such as
racial reconciliation, nationalization and indigenization in which
the government would redistribute land equitably for peasant
resettlement were not effectively accomplished as these national
policies would undermine corporate rights and the fundamental
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economic bases of ESAPs (Bello, 1993; Global Exchange, 2000).
For example the IMF and WB finance big rural projects like
dams, roads and power plants to facilitate economic development projects under SAPS, but these devastate biodiversity and
the environment and lead to social and population dislocation.
Additionally, SAPS reduce labor and environmental protection
leaving small farmers and businesses to compete with large multinational corporations which leads to workers being paid starvation wages and unable to fend for their families to the point
of being forced to live in inhumane conditions or left homeless.
Without enough land the urban-retrenched workers have no hope
of subsisting in overcrowded rural areas whose inhabitants have
historically viewed urban-employed relations as privileged and
as their safety net in periods of hardship. Thus, ESAPs have
been predictably devastating to the poor, further suffocating them
without adequate public welfare, without control of their economy and access to basic services, even more so than in the US
because Zimbabwe is a poor country to begin with. The cycle of
impoverishment is perpetuated and not eliminated.
Urban unemployment created a surge in the rural areas while
the land equation had not been addressed successfully because
it faced opposition from a historically powerful white lobbying group, the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU ), one of the
strong advocates for ESAPs. The CFU has steadfastly opposed
land reforms since colonial times, by claiming that changing
from large-scale farming to small-scale peasant farming with
communal tenure would devastate the economy. Such a stance
is inherited from racist colonial assumptions that indigenous
African peasants are inefficient and that they would degrade
the new land in the same way as the communal lands which
were called Tribal Trust Lands during the colonial period. These
assumptions have been challenged and refuted by progressive
Africanists (Moyo, 1994 & 1995; Biot; Lambert & Perkins, 1992;
Palmer & Burich, 1992; Potts, 1998). The fact is that colonialism
cultivated the soil erosion of the semi-arid communal lands by
packing the peasants and their domestic animals like sardines in
these areas and by introducing agricultural methods that were
not environmentally friendly. Land reforms also faced opposition from the peasants which included mass protest and public
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disturbance when they found out that land was changing hands
from the white elite to the black elite for the purpose of satisfying
commercial agricultural production for export to meet ESAPs'
donor obligations (Kawewe, 1998). The promotion of macroeconomic agricultural policies supported by ESAPs has perpetuated
peasant impoverishment.
Even the Social Dimensions Program, WB and IMF social
services program and stop-gap measure to alleviate the so called
temporary hardships arising out of the ESAPs, benefit a selected
minority of former middle-class victims of retrenchment in cities
and for only a limited period of time, leaving the rural and urban
poor in devastating impoverishment. Additionally, for the past 50
years, there exist an apparent discrepancy between stated objectives of the WB and other multinational institutions of capitalism
and free market economy, and implementation goals. Araghi
(1997) revealed information from a secret WB document by noting
its hidden philosophy and global economic development plans
intended to purposefully force four million people from their
lands in order to create room for WB projects in the South. It
would appear then that the Zimbabwe's indigenization and land
repossession programs to resettle peasants would be contrary to
this financial'donor's thesis or secret plan. Thus, ESAPs erosion of
the social welfare of indigenous peoples of Zimbabwe, with much
severity on women and children already marginalized seems in
line with SAPs goals being primarily driven by economic interests
of the industrialized nations.
When these most powerful political, and sociocultural and
ideological institutions of the world fashioned after trickle-down
economics, now make proclamations to improve women's education and productivity in the emerging economies (World Bank,
1999), they reflect a double standard in that they steadfastly impose SAP policies which require drastic cuts in social spending
of which education is a part and then when poverty becomes
an eye sore, debtor governments are blamed. These donors then
intervene and assume a rescuer/savior role for the poor while
at the same time undermining the authority of the state on its
people. For example when many rural women and children died
during the drought of the early 1990s, the World Bank intervened
by forcing the government to drop education and health fees
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which had been introduced to met budget austerity measures
under ESAPs.
BUDGET AUSTERITY AND
UNEMPLOYMENT SPELL SOCIAL UNREST
Although there is controversy over the outcomes of ESAP in
Zimbabwe as in many sub-Saharan countries, it has been noted
that the programs generally lead to retrenchment, skyrocketing
of prices of goods, rising inflation to record levels and steep
devaluation of local currencies. Unfortunately, the government
of Zimbabwe is caught up between the WB and IMF requirements and mass protests due to the devastating impoverishment
exacerbated by SAPs. These situations have lead to loss of power,
instability and /or increased military repression. Many governments have been toppled, but those that have survived have
used severe repression and/or manipulation of their masses with
rhetoric. In recent years, countries like Zambia and Zimbabwe
have witnessed a series of strikes and food riots followed by
military intervention that left eight people dead in Harare alone
(Schillinger, 1998). Schillinger (1998) notes: "An unprecedented
series of mass national protests over deteriorating economic conditions has brought the country-and its first president, Robert
Mugabe-to its worst political crisis since independence in 1980.
Many once held hope for a model democracy, characterized by
competitive politics, free expression, and a vibrant privatized
economy. Most now see another Kenya in the making where
corruption, repression, and mismanagement stagnate a potentially prosperous state," (1998, p. Al). Consequently, many lives
including women and children have been lost.
However, SAP had mixed impacts on economic development
and growth. While macroeconomic indicators show positive effects of structural adjustment on development and growth, many
Zimbabwe citizens find it difficult to cope with the overall effects
of adjustment. The problems posed to many citizen by the high
cost of utilities, the withdrawal of subsidies on health, education,
transportation and agricultural inputs, the retrenchment of labor
and the consequent high unemployment rate, and chronic low
salaries for workers, especially in the public sector, continue to engage the attention of many. There has been, therefore, the genuine
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fear that democratization and its embedded freedom would lead
to a revolt by the masses against further imposition of draconian
adjustment policies.
Another negative aspect of adjustment is the heavy reliance
on external financial support. Zimbabwe faces a bleak future
because of the over-dependence on external financial inflows. The
high levels of dependence on foreign aid equally cast a shadow
on the impact of structural adjustment. Because of abnormally
high levels of assistance from donors there is much difficulty
in disentangling the effects of external aid from the effects of
adjustment programs on Zimbabwe development (Jenkins 1996).
Jenkins (1996) and Kawewe (1998) therefore call into question
the resilience of the much-touted economic turnaround. Contrary to the IMF-World Bank recent rush at bailing out the Asian
economies with quick loan packages worth tens of billion dollars,
in Africa the economic relief efforts have been a never-ending
stingy effort in which negotiations can drag on for months. When
approved, the allotments reflect more of a life long dependency
program for sub-Sahara Africa (French, 1998).Furthermore Asian
nations can recover from the meltdown through IMF-WB bailouts
to pay creditors and to absorb the immediate severe economic
shock arising from credit and banking systems (Rotberg, 1998).
Instead, the IMF and WB resort to blaming the victim by claiming the speedy and size of their response to the Asian economies
as indicative of the importance of these economies to the global
financial system, and that if Zimbabwe and African countries in
like situations had adopted economic liberalization when they
were first introduced rather than resist change, Zimbabwe would
not have found itself in a marginalized situation it is in today. The
validity of the IMF-WB position and approach to the continent of
Africa is questionable as shown by the collapse of the early star
economic disciples of SAP (Boafo-Arthur, 1991) Ghana and later
Zimbabwe that have plunged into economic shambles. Contrary
to the IMF pronouncements of SAPs as bailing out efforts for
the continent's economies, in practice ESAPs have had a devastating impacts at the local level. Pragmatically, the transnational
corporations and international financial institutions have become
richer at the expense of the African nations due to a widening gap
between the North and South. Overall, ESAPs have necessitated
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dramatic budget cuts in allocations for social programs like health
(Melly, 1996), education, housing, water electricity (Araghi, 1997;
Anonymous, 1998a), and so forth. ESAPs have eroded further the
groups already disadvantaged. The disparity between those that
originally were disadvantaged and those that were privileged has
increased sharply (Mupedziswa, & Gumbo; Mupedziswa, 1994a,
1994b, 1996;Anonymous, 1996; Araghi, 997). Social workers, who
are mostly government employees, find themselves faced with
the challenges of helping clients to scramble for diminishing
life-sustaining resources. Even those professionals employed by
NGOs have been constrained by the selectivity in focus of the
programs. It will be fair to say that an emphasis on equity without
sufficient regard for efficiency-and consistency-can have perverse effects on equity and efficiency The policies pursued by the
government of Zimbabwe in compliance with SAPs have created
distortions, which pushed the economy towards macroeconomic
instability. In Zimbabwe the size of the civil service budget has
continued to drain the economy, rather than a facilitator of economic development and yet any cuts so far have translated into
further increases in unemployed and impoverishment.
The impact of public policy on the citizens of the United States
is parallel somewhat to the situation in Zimbabwe. In the 1960s
and 1970s, the number of homeless Americans began to increase
gradually in the wake of a series of public policy shifts. Most
significant were those affecting the availability of low-income
housing and the treatment of the mentally ill. It was the contraction in national social spending during this period, however,
which broadened and deepened the problem of homelessness.
Beginning with President Reagan's own Omnibus Reconciliation
Act of 1981, federal funding for a vast array of social programs was
slashed or capped, and a process that soon resonated throughout
all levels of government and community. While military spending increased by more than 40 percent in the 1980s, funding for
both health and job-training programs were slashed by the same
amount, and federal support of housing programs was reduced
by almost 80 percent. Included in the cuts were programs that
helped low-income families avoid the worst ravages of poverty, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),
where eligibility levels stiffened and benefit levels that already
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left families well below the poverty line were sharply lowered.
As more Americans were sinking into poverty, billions of dollars
were also taken away from the Food Stamp Program, eliminating
one million recipients (Reich 1989; da Costa Nunez 1995).
The policies of the 1980s were devastating to the American's
poor and, to a large extent, account for the unprecedented rise
in poverty and homeless rates, as well as the increased complexity of the problems now facing poor families. Economic trade
agreements and liberalization have had a devastating impact
on the poor in both developed and developing countries. The
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for example
had adverse effects on middle class and poor Americans through
retrenchment without corresponding increases in social spending on human capital development, job creation and training in
marketable skills, welfare and social service benefits (Kawewe,
1999). IMF mismanagement in the South creates financial crises,
which translate into poverty for both developing and developed
countries. For example when the IMF mismanagement led to the
financial crises in Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand and others resulting in a deep depression, 200 million newly poor were created
in these countries. Worse still the IMF, using conditionalities for
noncompliance directed these countries to export their way out
of the crises by dumping their steel in the US markets resulting
in over 12,000 American steel workers' lay offs (World Exchange,
2000; Danaher, 2000). Free trade agreements have translated into
lost jobs as companies folded up, relocated or operated their industries in the South in order to exploit a cheap labor force. Hence,
the 1999 Seattle rallies by people from all over the world opposing
the WTO's effort to have total control of the world's economy and
resources for the benefit of the wealthy and corporations (Global
Exchange, 2000; Danaher, 2000). Not only has the total number
of homeless Americans increased substantially in the past ten
years, but also there has been a marked change in the composition
of this group in the 1990s. Even the best designed education
and training programs produced only small gains for the poor,
especially welfare recipients. Economic feasibility has historically
translated into reduction in welfare rolls while compromising the
social cost as in the case of workfare and managed care. Welfare
reforms of the 1990s have been successful in shrinking the welfare
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rolls and reducing cost, but not poverty reduction (Caputo, 1993
& 1994; US Government, 1996; Freedman, 1990).
IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE,
SOCIAL WELFARE AND JUSTICE
Although social workers are not responsible for the social
problems caused by ESAP and ill-fated public policy, social
workers can be accountable for methods/approaches in which
programs and policies are implemented in their countries. In
Zimbabwe, social workers work in both public and parastatal
enterprises as social welfare practitioners and personnel officers.
By improving the ways in which services are delivered, social
workers can match the clients needs with the most effective
service and then advocate the need for the unmet needs. Social
workers should shift from assuming primarily a implementation
(recipient) role in public policy to being major players (pro-actors)
in policy formulation and development at local, state and international levels through advocacy. Social workers should utilize their
community development expertise to form social networks with
grass roots groups from both rural and urban areas in conjunction
with others in Africa and elsewhere (Kawewe, 1996,1998) and engage in innovative initiatives with international and local NGOs
to put pressure on the IMF-World Bank to value people more than
money. They can promote labor and social rights by advocating
for fair trade as opposed to free trade, opposing deregulation and
collaborating with grassroots organizations throughout the world
(Danaher, 2000). International forums are more effective for addressing the discrepancy in the IMF-World Bank agenda on Africa
through interdisciplinary endeavors that advocate democratic
and progressive governments with term limits not exceeding a
decade for any single presidency and more accountability on the
elites for their actions.
Social workers can utilize a variety of change strategies within
the continuum of the social action model of community organization, can collaborate with non government organizations (NGOs)
and grassroots non government organizations (GNDOs) who
have potential in developing critical capacity for advocacy in the
region (Lutabingwa & Gray, 1997), where about 811 NGOs with
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slightly over three tenths of them having been in existence since
the 1980s being found in sub-Sahara. The amount of financial
inflow from overseas to Africa through NGOs exceeds the world
bank/IMF funds when debt payments and servicing are factored
in (Kiondo, 1993) making grassroots village self-help type, regional, national and international endeavors (Kawewe, 1996), a
key to democracy in Zimbabwe and Africa in general. Social
workers could negotiate and navigate changes through social
networking processes with NGOs. There is a need to facilitate
the movement toward improving the women's entrepreneurship
and development of local economies for the benefit of themselves
and their children (Mupedziswa & Gumbo1993). There is need to
develop centers where young children become socialized to the
norms of education; where these children can watch their parents
begin employment and move off of the burden of ESAP; where
parents and children can learn together as a family, and begin
the cycle of education and independence. Bold initiatives such
as pushing a government program evaluation center will help
provide an opportunity to develop effective public policy and potentially make a meaningful difference (Kawewe & Dibie, 2000).
CONCLUSION
This study demonstrates that SAP has further marginalized
the Zimbabwean people more than they were ever before, by
creating an environment that threatens peace and social justice.
While the structural adjustment program, that was suggested by
the WB and IMF and adopted by the Zimbabwean government
might be good for western industrialized nations, it has created a
devastating impact on HIV/AIDS and various natural calamities.
Additionally some parallels have been drawn between the impact
of economic policies on social welfare of the poor in Zimbabwe
and the US. In both cases there is need to integrate social and
economic development by addressing issues of human capital
development and budget austerity versus consumption.
Once one of Africa's vibrant economies, Zimbabwe has stagnated to the detriment of women and children. There is a possibility of serious instability and unrest in Zimbabwe as a wave
of political turmoil sweeps the country (Schillinger, 1998). Social
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workers can work collaboratively with various groups including
the trade unions to find peaceful and productive life-saving solutions to the country's problems. The general impression held
about Africa is filled with mythology, but realistically, there are
smart African leaders, women, men, and children as anywhere
in the world and the existence of very real problems with people still surviving in sub-Saharan Africa is not deniable (Toler,
1998). Progressive human service professionals are challenged to
contribute to effective public policy formulation, implementation
and evaluation in pursuit of economic, social and human rights.
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